

INTRODUCTION

We undertook this study of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) to help chart a general direction for the program as it prepares to enter the 21st Century. While we touched on a wide range of issues and topics related to precommissioning education and training, three overarching questions guided our deliberations: (1) what type of lieutenant would the U.S. Army need; (2) would existing organizational and administrative arrangements adequately support the Army ROTC program; and (3) would current methods of developing lieutenants remain relevant and effective in the coming decades? Where we discovered disparities between what the ROTC presently does and what we believe the ROTC will need to do in the future, we sought to identify methods, means or mechanisms that would help eliminate these disparities. At the same time, we sought to identify ways to reduce the resource requirements of the ROTC without adversely affecting the quality of precommissioning education and training.

Since our mission was to identify needs and set a general azimuth for the future development of the ROTC program, we couched our findings and recommendations in general terms. Translating the vision presented in this study into concrete proposals is left to other, more narrowly focused study groups and panels that will wrestle with the myriad detailed questions that inevitably arise when a program as large and diverse as the ROTC attempts to make even modest adjustments to its way of operating. As this document is in the process of being produced, study groups looking at the ROTC curriculum and the administration of the ROTC scholarship system are preparing to meet. We trust that the findings and recommendations contained in this study are sufficiently clear to guide the efforts of these and subsequent successor groups.

SECTION I

Background

The last two decades have seen a flood of technological innovations that have revolutionized the way we access, transfer and manipulate information. This information revolution has profoundly affected every sector of society, none more so, perhaps, than the military sector. Many expect this revolution to accelerate. The United States Army has embarked on an effort to keep up with this ongoing revolution by incorporating new advances in information technology at every organizational level. This effort has moved the Army to reassess the way it organizes its forces, trains its people, and develops its leaders.

The challenge posed by technological advances is not the only one the Army must face. A fundamental reordering of the international system is occurring simultaneously with the information revolution and is also compelling the Army to reevaluate the way it operates.

During the Cold War, the Army's training and leader development programs focused on preparing the officer to fight on a mid- to high-intensity battlefield. This focus was appropriate given that the Soviet threat to Central Europe constituted the most dangerous threat to national security. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic picture and the strategic assumptions that guided policy formulation and contingency planning changed abruptly.

It soon became evident that the prescriptions of the past would not necessarily work in the new post-Cold War world. The lieutenant trained to defend the Fulda Gap against a Soviet attack might not be an effective peacekeeper in Bosnia. Lieutenants of tomorrow will need a broader range of intellectual skills and abilities than their Cold War predecessors to function effectively in this new and rapidly changing international environment.

Moreover, changes in demographics and societal values have and will continue to change the way the Army recruits and trains its people. Current forecasts indicate that the ethnic composition of the nation will undergo profound changes in the first three decades of the 21st Century. By 2030, Hispanics will be the largest

ethnic minority and the percentage of non-Hispanic whites in the population will shrink to 50 percent or less. Greater diversity will make the Army's job of recruiting, selecting and developing its officers more complex than ever.

The bedrock Army values—loyalty, duty, respect for others, selfless service, honor, integrity, personal courage—might, some fear, be very hazy concepts for many young people in the 21st Century. Dr. Pat Shields projected that the number and percentage of single-parent families would continue to grow over the next several decades. The Army can expect that more of its junior leaders will come from such families in the future. Individuals brought up in single-parent families are not as likely to develop the same set of traditional values or hold as firmly to those traditional values as are individuals raised in two-parent households. Dr. Howard Prince spoke about the pervasive influence of intellectual and moral relativism on many university faculties. On some campuses, adherence to traditional values is seen as a sign of narrow-mindedness or intolerance. Thus, if students have not developed a well-defined set of values before they go to college, it is not certain, or even particularly likely, that they will develop them while attending college.

The Army will probably have to meet the many challenges it will face in the 21st Century in a resource-constrained environment. The budgetary and political pressures that resulted in a 40 percent cut in active Army end strength between 1988 and 1998 will continue to shape officer procurement and officer production policy in the foreseeable future. Indeed, unless there are major changes in the international environment, these pressures will probably grow. Cadet Command must intensify its search for more cost-effective ways to conduct precommissioning education and training.

Formation of the Study Group

It was against such a backdrop of change, uncertainty, and fiscal austerity that Cadet Command began its inquiry into precommissioning education and training in the 21st Century. The origins of the long range review date back to October 1997 when Cadet Command leaders became convinced that technological, political, social, demographic and fiscal forces might, in the very near

future, force fundamental changes in the administration and operation of the ROTC program. These leaders wanted to direct this change and saw the long-range review as a means to this end.

The commander's vision for the long range review called for the development of an ROTC program for the 21st Century that provided qualified lieutenants for the U.S. Army and, in so doing, maximized educational opportunities, ensured that cadets were trained to standards and consumed fewer resources. That vision further specified that lieutenants produced through the ROTC program must possess requisite Army values, attributes and skills and be capable of performing the actions required of junior officers.

After Cadet Command established the goals and objectives of the review, it selected a study group to conduct it. The study group consisted of seven military officers and two civilians. All seven military officers were Professors of Military Science commanding ROTC battalions. In selecting these officers, Cadet Command Headquarters sought to achieve representation from every geographical region of the country and from every type of school (large vs. small, state vs. private, expensive vs. inexpensive, highly selective in admissions vs. minimally selective). One civilian member of the study was the chief of the command's education and assessment division. He was included because of his knowledge of the university-related aspects of the ROTC education program. The other civilian, the command historian, was brought in to provide historical context for the study.

The study group read a wide variety of relevant documents and received briefings from distinguished to give it a balanced view of the Army's leadership needs and the best methods for developing officers. It chose both readings and consultants with the objectives of balancing (1) a military with a civilian perspective, (2) a past with a future focus and (3) experience with research. Cadet Command provided the consultants with a pre-designed package that outlined the purpose and the objectives of the long-range review. The Army's new leadership doctrine, as contained in the 1998 draft of FM 22-100, Army Leadership, was the analytical touchstone for this review of precommissioning education and training in the ROTC program.

Cadet Command entrusted the study group with the tasks of deliberating, analyzing and drawing conclusions from the readings and consultants; synthesizing the information into a coherent view of precommissioning development needs; and making recommendations to implement the necessary changes.

Major General Stewart W. Wallace, the Commander of Cadet Command, briefed the tentative results of the long-range review to the TRADOC Commander, General John Abrams, on 9 October 1998. General Abrams, while generally approving of the study group's work, directed that the study be expanded to encompass a wider range of opinion. He wanted Cadet Command to get feedback from the consumers—i.e, battalion commanders and senior noncommissioned officers with recent experience with ROTC lieutenants in the field and preferably in a recent contingency operation. Based on General Abrams guidance, representatives from Cadet Command Headquarters interviewed Army War College students with recent battalion command experience, students at the Sergeants Major Academy with recent troop experience, and selected Korean War veterans. Most of those interviewed at the Army War College and at the Sergeants Major Academy had held battalion level leadership positions in one or more of the post-Desert Storm contingency missions in which the U.S. Army participated.

Previous Studies of the ROTC Program

Since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, there have been several official studies that have dealt at length with the Army ROTC program. Relevant information contained in these studies is summarized below.

Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO).

The RETO Study, completed in 1978, made numerous recommendations to strengthen and streamline the Army's system of officer education and training. Unlike most other official studies of this type, the RETO report devoted a great deal of space to precommissioning education and training. As might be anticipated in an era of fiscal austerity, the RETO study group was told by the Army's Chief of Staff to frame its recommendations in such a way as to make them acceptable in and appropriate for a "constrained resource environment." Cost, in other

words, was to be the study group's lodestar. Manpower, the budget item that when cut yields the greatest short-term savings, was the area in which the study group hoped to economize.

The study group believed that precommissioning preparation should be more of an educational than a training experience, and more theoretical than practical in nature. The "pay-off" of precommissioning learning would come only after "being amplified" by practical field experience, a philosophy to which most professions and professional schools subscribe. In the precommissioning programs of other western nations, it noted approvingly, education took up 80 percent of the program of instruction, training only 20 percent. It expressly refuted those observers who argued that precommissioning learning should focus almost exclusively on turning out competent platoon leaders:

If one provides to aspirants only that learning which will allow them to function as second lieutenants, a great deal of money might be saved; second lieutenants have little need for computer programming, physics, or research techniques, and they might even get by without knowledge of military history or military law. But their capacity to grow will have been stunted...

The authors of the RETO study felt that the attainment of the baccalaureate degree was the "proper quality standard" for the ROTC program. They were not concerned about the type of degree that lieutenants earned. For most officers, they maintained, a general education in one of the liberal arts or sciences would be sufficient. However, they did recommend that the ROTC curriculum include "extensive work" in communications skills, research and information skills, and analytical, computing and conceptualization skills along with courses in military law, military history, organizational behavior, national security affairs and "the behavioral sciences."

The RETO study also recommended the establishment of precommissioning accession assessment centers to measure the medical, physical, motivational and leadership aptitude of prospective cadets. The assessment center concept was designed to identify those prospective officer candidates who possessed the requisite skills and

attributes to become officers and to turn away those who did not. By eliminating unfit candidates before they enrolled in the Advanced Course, these centers would save the Army time, effort, money and manpower.

Study group members observed that the Army could get more production for its money if it increased the number of two and three year scholarships while reducing the number of four year awards. Admittedly, quality—as measured by SAT scores—might decline but a “good selection of highly qualified students would still be possible.” Moreover, if the bulk of scholarships were of the two year variety, the “unacceptable” attrition rates in the Basic Course would disappear.

Reserve Officers' Training Corps Study Group Report. The Chief of Staff of the Army chartered this study group in October 1984. Its charge was to conduct a comprehensive review of the ROTC program. The study group published its findings in May 1986. Much of its report dealt with recruiting and advertising, which was to be expected given the existing production shortfalls and the pessimistic demographic forecasts which told of an impending decline in the number of college age youth. The group concluded that the Army must develop more efficient ROTC recruiting practices and raise the “sensitivity and visibility” of the ROTC recruiting effort “at all levels.” It recommended, among other things, that the responsibility for high school recruiting be turned over to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and a more credible “mission model” based on a “detailed market analysis” be developed. It also endorsed a TRADOC proposal to create an Education Assistance Allowance (EAA), a financial incentive designed to raise the MS II to MS III retention rate.

The study group also expended considerable effort in searching for the “optimum placement and structural design” of the ROTC. This effort led to the recommendation to establish ROTC as a major subordinate command of TRADOC. In the study group’s schema, all logistical and administrative functions were to be taken out of the region headquarters and consolidated at the national level. This consolidation would allow region and area commanders to focus on training and recruiting—areas that the study group felt were being slighted.

The ROTC study group expressed concerns about ROTC's low intellectual standards. Its concerns echoed those voiced by Army field commanders and school commandants who maintained that too many newly commissioned ROTC lieutenants had serious deficiencies in the basic education skills of writing, reading and mathematics. The Army's Vice Chief of Staff told school commandants to develop programs that would ensure that all officer basic course (OBC) graduates could read at the twelfth grade level.

In the opinion of this study group, a cadet's pre-commissioning experience should equip him or her with the following: (1) the knowledge, skills and abilities necessary for military decision making; (2) the ability to apply analytical processes to decision making; (3) general problem solving skills; (4) mathematical skills; and (5) written and oral communications skills. "A disciplined, systematic acquisition of basic intellectual skills in precommissioning education," the study group maintained, "enables post-commissioning education to achieve a higher quality, reduce time and energy expended on remedial work, and enhance the officer's professional development." Like the RETO panel, the ROTC study group believed that a "general education" in one of the liberal arts or sciences provided "enough focus for most officers."

Army Science Board Ad Hoc Study. The authors of this Ad Hoc Study (February, 1996) deplored the general state of technological illiteracy that they believed characterized the officer corps. To address this problem, they made three "overall recommendations" relative to the Army's officer education system: (1) imbue technological values in the officer corps' ethos; (2) develop a vision, strategy, concept and time-phased action plan to institutionalize technological expertise in the officer corps; and (3) establish a personnel management process and career development path that keep pace with the acceleration of technological change.

The study noted that while the Army's reliance on technology had been growing, it had been reducing its cadre of technology-literate officers and science, math and engineering (SM&E)-educated officers. The Army's system of precommissioning education, it was alleged, was partly responsible for this state of affairs. The

study's authors did not think that the ROTC was equipping its commissionees with the requisite educational background. Specifically, it charged that the ROTC (1) does not have minimal SM&E educational requirements for commissioning; (2) does not link scholarships to the Army's scientific requirements; and (3) does not adequately define scientific degrees (e.g., it classifies accounting as a scientific discipline).

Moreover, the study charged, the ROTC was losing its "brightest prospects from the MITs and Harvards of the world." This was because the Army was offering less generous scholarships than the Air Force and Navy. The Army covered only a portion of a scholarship cadet's tuition while the other services covered the entire amount. The board commented:

Implementation of such a [scholarship] policy exemplifies—and communicates to the nation's educational and political leaders—the quantity-versus-quality commitment evident in the Army's personnel acquisition strategy, and that the Army is willing to forego first class SM&E talent.

Results of Previous Studies. The Army adopted many of the individual recommendations made by the RETO Panel and the ROTC Study Group. RETO's legacy includes Cadet Command's system of leadership assessment, used both to develop and evaluate leadership, and TRADOC's precommissioning common core tasks (PCT), a set of basic military skills that new lieutenants are supposed to master before reporting to their branch officer basic courses. The ROTC Study Group advocated the establishment of the ROTC as a major subordinate command of TRADOC in its report. General William R. Richardson, the TRADOC Commander, created this independent command for the management and operation of the ROTC program in April 1986. The Army Science Board's report did not have an immediate impact on precommissioning training but it did stimulate debate.

Yet the overall impact of these studies on precommissioning education and training was limited. One reason for this was that there was no effective organization in place within the ROTC command structure to assume ownership of these recommendations or integrate them into the fabric of the ROTC program. Some of the

measures recommended in these studies endured but, more often than not, they were implemented piece-meal. Somewhere along the way, the overarching concepts or ideas that inspired the recommendations were lost. Moreover, these studies were conducted by what was essentially an ad hoc assemblage of officers intent on solving a set of immediate or near-term problems. Rather than establishing a vision for the ROTC program, which would have given their recommendations coherence and direction, they came up with a set of prescriptions to remedy existing ills.

SECTION II

Findings

Our investigation led us to the following conclusions or findings about the nature of precommissioning training, development and education. These conclusions were shaped by an extensive analysis of the presentations, readings and interviews. They represent a group synthesis of information and expert assertions. Our synthesis was guided by the consistency of information across sources and by our collective military experience. Synopses of the presentations and papers of the various consultants are included in the appendices.

From the various presentations and readings, we distilled the most significant points and included them in this section. These points form the philosophical and intellectual underpinnings of our specific recommendations that are presented in the next section. Our major findings are:

- The military consultants along with the majority of students at the Army War College and the Sergeants Major Academy believed that Cadet Command **"has things about right."** They commended the fundamental change of direction in the ROTC program that began with the establishment of Cadet Command in 1986. That change of direction entailed a combination of improved technical and tactical training and a more systematic method of leader development. Cadet Command is turning out an excellent product and should be wary of making major changes to the program without thoroughly assessing the probable impacts.
- Precommissioning education and training in the early 21st Century must provide the ROTC cadet with a solid foundation for continued learning (self-development) throughout a full military career, from the OBC through retirement. The ROTC program, therefore, must continue to have a dual focus: (1) to provide the cadet with those values, attributes and skills necessary for his continuing development as an officer and (2) to provide the cadet with the entry level skills necessary for the next level of training (i.e., OBC).

- The attainment of a baccalaureate degree should remain the quality standard for precommissioning education. The degree helps ensure that the officer possesses certain necessary intellectual capacities and experiences and that he or she has gone through certain developmental stages. Moreover, the baccalaureate degree requirement helps sustain the vital partnership between the Army and the nation's intellectual centers and maintain the diversity that the ROTC gives to the officer corps.

- The consultants were unanimous in stressing the importance of promoting Army values and good character in precommissioning education. Precommissioning training is inadequate unless it develops in cadets a deep respect for the dignity and worth of others and imbues them with a keen sense of responsibility for their profession and for the society that they serve. The trend toward more single parent families and the strong influence of moral relativism on college campuses give Army values an unprecedented urgency. The ROTC must take every appropriate measure to ensure that newly commissioned officers understand and internalize Army values. This must include formal instruction in values and ethics as a regular part of the ROTC curriculum.

- It is especially important that precommissioning education address the value of selfless service. According to First Sergeant Martinez and students at the Army War College and Sergeants Major Academy, this value is not fully developed in many new lieutenants. Some new lieutenants report to their first assignment indicating their intention to leave the Army as soon as their service obligation expires. This gives the impression to junior enlisted soldiers that these lieutenants are focused more on their future employment prospects than on the mission at hand. This type of behavior, which cuts across commissioning sources, is indicative of what many see as a larger problem. This larger problem entails the perceived failure on the part of some recently commissioned officers to subordinate their personal convenience and interests to the interests of their unit, their soldiers and the Army. Fortunately, this failure, in the great majority of cases, reflects an ignorance of accepted professional norms rather than a surly or disaffected attitude. Junior leaders want to do the right thing but sometimes do not know what the right

thing is. This shortcoming can be corrected for the most part by education and professional socialization in the precommissioning years.

- Respect for others is another value that must be stressed in precommissioning education. Along with the nation, the Army will become more ethnically and culturally diverse in the 21st Century. Leaders must be tolerant of those who hold beliefs different from their own. Even more importantly, they must learn to foster an environment of tolerance and acceptance within their unit. Moreover, it must be impressed upon them in their precommissioning years that respect is a value essential for the development of disciplined, cohesive and effective warfighting units. Respect engenders trust which in turn promotes discipline and unit cohesion. A lack of respect produces suspicion which erodes discipline and unit cohesion.
- The concept of "officership" is another theme that received attention from several consultants. One consultant, Dr. Don Snider, thematically structured his presentation around this concept. Officership, as used in this context, emphasizes the importance and uniqueness of the social contract that bonds American officers to American society and entrusts them with the task of fighting the nation's wars. It encompasses the tenets of the "warrior ethos" but goes far beyond this by stressing the moral obligation of officers to be completely committed to the society they serve and to the profession they have chosen. The concept emphasizes the special social position of the officer corps as a repository of national values. It is especially important that officers internalize the principles of officership during periods of prolonged peace when no galvanizing threat exists to underscore the importance of the military to the public. In such an environment, the inculcation of appropriate values and the development of a relevant mind-set become as important as preparing cadets to become platoon leaders. The officer corps needs to keep the faith in times of peace so that it can draw upon that faith in times of need. If faith disappears, it cannot be easily or quickly restored.
- Precommissioning education and training must prepare the lieutenant to operate effectively on the mid-to high-intensity battlefield of the early 21st Century. War will

be more complex and demand a more mentally agile officer to conduct it. That officer must be able to scan and filter the immense flow of information that will be available to him and quickly determine what is relevant and what is not. General Hartzog asserted that the capacity to eliminate irrelevant information is one of the most critical skills that junior officers will need on the digitally enhanced battlefield of the future. In addition, junior officers must be comfortable with ambiguity and pressure and possess the ability to make rapid decisions under conditions of uncertainty and stress. Without these attributes and skills, the officer will be unable to see through the "fog of war" that, observers like Brigadier General J. M. Dubik tell us, will continue to cloud the battlefield of the next century.

- At the same time, a majority of consultants agreed that technological sophistication should not be over-emphasized in the precommissioning years. General RisCassi stated that the Army should not turn the soldier into an icon; the Army must strike a balance between computer skills and the warrior spirit in the development of officers. Most freshman will enter college with a sufficient level of computer proficiency to effectively function as an ROTC cadet and a second lieutenant. Margaret Salter and Barbara Black noted in a recent Army Research Institute (ARI) report that, for students who have grown up with computer games and video arcades, the absence of computer proficiency might be more notable than its presence. Those that do not have this proficiency will develop it in the course of their regular academic work. Indeed, written and oral communications seem to pose a greater problem to newly commissioned lieutenants than computer skills.

- A majority of the consultants believed that Cadet Command should carefully and thoroughly consider the Army Science Board's recommendation to link Army scholarships more closely to the Army's scientific requirements and to prescribe science, math and engineering educational requirements for commissioning. Attracting more SM&E majors into the officer corps is a worthy goal, but adjusting scholarship selection criteria or prescribing SM&E commissioning requirements might have unforeseen or unintended side-effects.

- Preparing the officer to function effectively on the mid- to high-intensity battlefield of the future is not enough. The Army must also equip the officer with those skills, attributes and abilities demanded by operations other than war. To produce a lieutenant prepared to serve across the entire spectrum of conflict, the study group believed that Cadet Command should adopt General Peay's "strategic" view of precommissioning education and training. By "strategic," General Peay means that precommissioning preparation and instruction should be largely educational and theoretical in nature and aimed at imparting those enduring values and attributes that officer aspirants can build on and use throughout their entire military career. This will result in a more flexible and adaptable lieutenant—one prepared to deal with a broad range of challenges. If the command adopts this model of precommissioning learning, it will bring the ROTC in line with many other pre-professional programs that focus on teaching the apprentice how to think rather than on filling him with large volumes of short-lived technical knowledge. At the same time, Peay made it clear that he did not advocate abandoning tactical training; he just wanted to shift certain portions of it to summer camp and OBC. Finally, General Peay expressed concern about the post-Desert Storm trend to close, in the name of fiscal efficiency, ROTC units that did not meet certain quantitative production goals. If the Army cut back too far, he feared, its principal officer education program would find itself limited to a few large universities. This would have the potential to make the ROTC and the officer corps less representative of the population at large and take away one of the Army's main vehicles of public outreach—the ROTC unit. In an era in which the Army is becoming smaller and its opportunities for close and meaningful interaction with the larger society are becoming fewer, it is critical that it maintain strong links with the nation's intellectual centers. Otherwise, the Army might find public understanding of and support for it eroding.

- All of the consultants placed great emphasis on the development of interpersonal skills in the precommissioning education process. These skills, which some of the consultants emphasized more than cognitive skills, are valuable in missions and roles that span the spectrum of conflict. They include the ability to get along with people; the ability to communicate in speech

and writing; the ability to listen, empathize and understand; teamwork and the ability to develop teams. Of these interpersonal skills, teamwork and communication are particularly important. Teamwork is a theme that ran through virtually all the presentations and articles. So was communication, especially the kind of face to face communication that allows a leader to inform, direct and motivate his subordinates.

- Counseling—problem counseling in particular—is another very important interpersonal skill that the recently commissioned officer should possess. Many lieutenants arrive at their first duty station ill-equipped to help junior enlisted soldiers with their marital, financial, substance abuse and other problems. Second lieutenants should have an understanding of counseling theory and a grasp of basic counseling techniques and procedures. They must also be made aware that counseling entails active listening. Lieutenants must be conditioned to be attentive to both the words of a soldier and the manner in which these words are delivered. Tone of voice, inflection, pauses and the speed of delivery are sometimes more illuminating than the actual words themselves.

- Some of the consultants, Generals Richardson and Vuono in particular, emphasized the importance of tactical and technical competence. However, technical skill, which draft FM 22-100 defines as "skill with things," definitely falls behind tactical skills, which the draft FM defines as "skill with people, ideas and things," on the precommissioning list of training priorities. Technical and tactical training does much more than teach cadets certain elementary military skills and prepare them for their officer basic course. It also serves as a vehicle for the development of higher order problem solving, leadership and decision-making competencies and, to paraphrase General Richardson, gives them an idea of what the Army is all about. It is important that the ROTC give cadets a clear and accurate picture of what Army life is like. This will help reduce reality shock when they enter the Army and avoid attracting students into the program who will later leave because they received an inaccurate picture of the military profession. Developing technical and tactical competence in cadets should remain an important aim of the ROTC program.

- The military consultants and the students we surveyed in El Paso and Carlisle were concerned about the "zero defects" environment that has grown up in the Army since the end of Operation Desert Storm. They view this repressive atmosphere as inimical to the development of initiative and critical thinking skills vital to junior officers. The freedom to take calculated risks and experience occasional failure must exist in the Army. ROTC instructors should encourage cadets to take calculated risks giving them an opportunity to grow and make mistakes. Cadet Command must do everything within its power to ensure that a "zero defects" environment does not pervade the ROTC program.

- The consultants, Generals RisCassi and Richardson in particular, stressed the importance of the instructor's role as a mentor and role model to cadets. According to General Richardson, cadets learn by "osmosis," that is, by observing and emulating a professional example. He believes that they learn more about the Army and leadership in this way than they do in ROTC courses. Recruiting and career motivation in cadets are also closely related to mentorship and role modeling. The dynamic and assertive young captain who nurtures professional relationships with cadets is perhaps the program's best recruiting and retention tool. This is why it is critical that the Army assign top quality active duty officers as ROTC instructors. Through their personal example, outstanding officers communicate to cadets what it means to be a leader and instill in them a desire for a military career. Unmotivated ROTC instructors, on the other hand, often do great damage.

- The face-to-face interaction between cadet and officer is an invaluable aspect of the ROTC experience and should not be sacrificed to distance learning methodologies. The consultants concede that many knowledge-based skills can be effectively taught electronically and that Cadet Command could achieve some economies in this area. However, such practices must be balanced against the need for personal interaction between officer and officer aspirant. For it is through close and frequent contact between officer and cadet that the norms, values and traditions of the officer corps and the Army are transmitted.

- The consultants applauded Cadet Command's efforts and achievements in the areas of leadership development and assessment. Only by using a valid system of documented assessment and developmental feedback can the Army be sure that the young people it commissions possess the potential and requisite skills to be officers.

- There was general agreement that, in the future, officers must exhibit a high degree of cultural awareness and sensitivity. ROTC must be attentive to two demands in this regard. Internally, it must plan for the growing number of Hispanics and Asians in the population. Externally, it must ensure that ROTC graduates possess a high degree of cultural sensitivity to enable them to perform effectively in a variety of foreign settings. Cultural awareness and sensitivity are especially valuable on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict where a rich and varied socio-political knowledge base is often more important than a proficiency with the employment of weapons systems.

- Some of the consultants—General Hartzog in particular—asserted that the ROTC has become too time-consuming at some universities. Cadets at these schools spend many hours during the week and a majority of their weekends engaged in or preparing for ROTC related activities. Some cadets are practically majoring in ROTC. This can and, in a few instances, has resulted in an imbalance in the ROTC program and in ROTC cadets. General Peay noted that there is a lack of athletes in the program—a lack which he attributed to the ROTC's demands on the student's time. He believed that the Army needed broadly educated and well-rounded people to lead it. To promote this end, he believed the cadets should be encouraged to develop intellectually, socially and culturally as well as militarily and be afforded the opportunity to participate in a wide range of extracurricular activities. In some units, this is now very difficult to do.

- Brigadier General Howard Prince, Dr. Owen Jacobs and Dr. Michael Rumsey stressed the importance of cognitive capacities in the selection and development of officers. Indeed, Dr. Rumsey intimated that cognitive capacity would be the most important determinant of leadership success in the 21st Century. The lieutenant will need skills such as moral reasoning, critical thinking and

evaluating, systematic inquiry, analysis, synthesis, visualization, communication and cultural sensitivity. The consultants also emphasized the need to supplement these intellectual skills with a broad knowledge base. These are very ambitious goals—goals that the ROTC curriculum alone cannot achieve. Cadet Command needs to integrate the ROTC and college curricula in such a way that will facilitate the achievement of the desired intellectual and knowledge gains.

- Military history should remain an important component of the ROTC knowledge base and a commissioning requirement. More than any other consultant, Representative Ike Skelton emphasized the importance of this subject to the professional Army officer. The study of history broadens perspectives; gives insights into a culturally diverse world; develops sensitivity to the ideas and experiences of others across cultures, location and time; enhances understanding of human behavior; develops critical thinking skills and analytical reasoning abilities; and helps leaders discern broad patterns and anticipate and shape change. Moreover, an understanding of how military organizations have dealt with problems in the past enables leaders to address contemporary problems more effectively.

- Dr. William Snyder emphasized the desirability of closing small, inefficient ROTC units. Some ROTC units, he noted, habitually fail to graduate the requisite number of officers. Indeed, over the last several years, some have produced, on average, fewer than four lieutenants per year. The continued operation of such units results in fiscal waste and poor training since a unit must attain a certain minimum size before it can offer meaningful leadership training to cadets. The assertion that large ROTC programs tend to produce better leaders surfaced during interviews at the Sergeants Major Academy and in a survey of division commanders conducted by Cadet Command. Here again, the idea is that cadets in very small units (like officer candidates in very small state-operated National Guard OCS programs) simply do not have the same opportunities for leadership as cadets at more robust units. These small and inefficient producers must be closed and the cadre redistributed to more efficient and productive units.

- Lieutenant General Ohle stressed the importance of building a review process into the ROTC "system." Such a review process is necessary for Cadet Command to give relevant and meaningful feedback to senior Army leaders and to ensure that the ROTC can adapt to changes in the Army and in society.
- The consultants along with the students at the Army War College and Sergeants Major Academy collectively painted a picture of the lieutenant needed for the 21st Century. The values, attributes, actions and skills most often mentioned as key to success as a junior officer are listed below:

SKILLS

- *Decision-making*; particularly the ability to make complex and rapid decisions while fatigued and in a chaotic, ambiguous and time-constrained environment. The demands of the digitally-enhanced battlefield of the future will place a premium on these skills.
- *Interpersonal*; including the ability to work as a team member; to effectively work with individuals and groups of diverse cultural backgrounds; and to develop and promote the productivity of teams; also encompasses counseling skills.
- *Analytical*; the ability to break a complex problem or situation into its constituent parts and to discern the relationships between these parts to facilitate planning, organizing, implementing, and evaluating.
- *Synthetic*; the mental construction of a greater, broader or more comprehensive understanding through the combination of various elements of information to form a coherent whole.
- *Computer*; including proficiency in spreadsheet, presentation graphics and contemporary word processing programs.
- *Oral and written communications*; including the ability to clearly communicate a message to others of diverse backgrounds.

- *Information filtering*; the ability to scan massive amounts of information quickly and efficiently and decide what is relevant and what is not.
- *Research*; the skills necessary to systematically seek knowledge and information.

ATTRIBUTES

- *Mental agility*; the ability to rapidly comprehend complex problems, quickly shift focus between problems and adjust to changes in problems as they occur.
- *Flexibility*; the psychological elasticity necessary to adapt to different settings and situations.
- *Adaptability*; the ability to adjust quickly to a variety of different missions; adaptability is particularly important in operations other than war.
- *Physical hardiness*; physical strength, endurance, self-confidence and the ability to cope with extremes of climate, terrain and operating conditions.
- *Emotional hardiness*; the ability to endure boredom, fatigue, isolation, discomfort, fear and stress and still function effectively in an ambiguous and rapidly changing environment.
- *Followership*; the inclination to loyally and resolutely execute the legal orders of one's superiors in the chain of command even when those orders are not in accord with one's own desires, preferences or opinions.
- *Dominance*; defined by Wing, Peterson and Hoffman as the "tendency to seek out and enjoy positions of leadership and influence over others. The ... dominant person is forceful and persuasive at those times when adopting such characteristics is important."

ACTIONS

- *Team Building*; involves caring for, counseling, coaching, evaluating, assessing and training subordinates; results in strong bonds of mutual trust and mutual respect; cements discipline and unit esprit.

- *Decision Making*; synonymous with problem solving; includes identifying problem situations, collecting relevant information, analyzing information, formulating a solution and implementing the solution.

VALUES

- *Selfless Service*; the willingness and ability to place the interests of the nation, the Army, the unit and subordinates above one's own personal interests, preferences and desires.
- *Respect*; denotes the regard and recognition of the dignity of others; it is treating people as they should be treated.

SECTION III

Recommendations

From our findings, we developed recommendations that we believe will produce the kind of lieutenant that our Army will need in the 21st Century and grouped them by functional system.

Before listing and discussing these recommendations, we will outline the end state toward which we see our recommendations leading. We offer this "vision" of the desired ROTC end state to clarify this report and our intentions.

Vision

At present, the educational aspects of the ROTC program are receiving significantly less attention than the training aspects. This could have serious adverse consequences given the greater intellectual and cognitive demands that, our military and civilian consultants tell us, will be placed on junior officers in the future. We envision the present system of ROTC precommissioning preparation, which is heavily oriented towards training, evolving into a system that strikes a balance between education and training. William Snyder's prescription for an ROTC Program of Instruction (POI) with a 50/50 balance between education and training we feel is about right (as opposed to the 80/20 balance in favor of training that exists today).

In the new system, the bulk of tactical and technical training will be conducted at the ROTC Advanced Camp, which will retain its rigor and stress. The availability of superior facilities and resources coupled with the absence of training distracters allow tactical and technical skills to be taught and learned more efficiently at Advanced Camp than on the college campus. Training will still be conducted on campus but on a reduced scale. Its focus will be on leader development and career motivation rather than on just skill acquisition. The ROTC will retain in its program of instruction only those skills necessary to conduct squad operations. This minimum essential skill set is an enabling mechanism for addressing higher-order leader development goals, not an instructional end in itself.

At its core, ROTC is not about teaching or learning highly perishable military skills.

In the new system, leadership laboratories will become more challenging and exciting. Adventure training will be prominently featured. These laboratories will have a recruiting/retention as well as a leader development value. To free the program from scheduling constraints, Professors of Military Science may elect to consolidate them; that is, hold them once every two or three weeks instead of weekly but make them two to three times longer in duration.

To teach the necessary cognitive skills and develop the requisite attributes and values, the ROTC will adopt a small-group learning format. This format will foster student-centered as opposed to instructor-centered learning and will broaden the role of the ROTC instructor. The instructor will become more of an educator/facilitator and less of a trainer during the academic year. In his new role the instructor will lead classroom discussions; guide cadets through analyses of case studies; ask probing, thought-provoking questions; elicit student participation; and stimulate discussion. The new role will stand in stark contrast to the old in which "canned" exercises and scripted lessons out of TRADOC-produced training support packages often were the instructor's principal resources. This will bring Cadet Command on line with the rest of the Army education system and expose cadets to the those ways of thinking, analyzing and reasoning that they will encounter and use upon entering the Army. In the new curriculum, oral and written communications, critical thinking, decision making and values will play a prominent role.

To develop a curriculum and training program that supports the recommendations contained in this report, the command should establish a Training Development Cell within the headquarters. The individuals assigned to the Training Development Cell would serve as Cadet Command's internal experts on educational processes, curriculum development and leadership development. The duties of this cell should encompass the development of case studies on subjects such as values, ethics and decision-making.

The planning office should be immediately subordinate to the Commanding General and headed by a senior officer of

high repute. Someone with the stature of the Deputy Commanding General of Cadet Command would be an appropriate choice. The planning office would play a role within Cadet Command somewhat analogous to the role that the Army After Next (AAN) project plays within TRADOC, although its focus would be more restricted. It would assist the Commanding General in crafting a vision of future ROTC requirements not constrained by near-term institutional influences; seek to think through the organizational, administrative and human changes that will be required to meet the challenges of the future; and provide a clear focus and sense of priority to necessary research and developmental activities. Such an approach is necessary to free the command from its focus on the near-term battle with the attendant action-reaction cycle of incremental and spasmodic change.

Since personal interaction with ROTC cadre is the principal means by which cadets are socialized into the military profession, Cadet Command must continue to press to get top quality active duty officers assigned as instructors. The old ROTC adage "quality begets quality" is just as true today as it was eight decades ago at the program's inception. The ROTC program must retain the noncommissioned officer as an integral part of the instructor group. Noncommissioned officers give cadets insights into the military profession and into Army life that they cannot get from officer instructors.

While the ROTC program must alter its curriculum and shift its emphasis in certain areas to meet the demands of the future, it must not in the process sacrifice or compromise those aspects of the program that have proved so valuable over the last twelve years. It must retain its outstanding leader development and assessment program along with its system of rigorous and stressful summer training. The combination of a systematic leader development program and rigorous and stressful summer training has produced and is producing competent and confident lieutenants, at ease with responsibility and imbued with the warrior ethos.

Curriculum

- Encourage cadets to take courses offered by the university that would logically promote the development of the attributes, skills, values and knowledge

identified by the consultants and the study group's research efforts as key to professional success in the 21st Century. Some of the courses that will aid in the development or acquisition of these attributes, skills, values and knowledge are:

- World Geography
 - English (writing and literature)
 - International Relations
 - Psychology (social and educational)
 - Comparative Religion
 - Cultural Anthropology
 - Philosophy
 - Foreign Languages
 - Comparative Government
 - Macro Economics
 - Scientific Methods
 - Mathematics
 - Computer Science
 - Physical Education
-
- Introduce individual and group case studies on subjects such as character development, ethics, decision-making, leadership, etc. that are progressive in their complexity and ambiguity. Sequence these case studies so that they combine over the span of the cadet experience to form a greater, more sophisticated comprehension.

 - Introduce formal values instruction into the ROTC curriculum. Incorporate methodologies for ethical decision-making into this instruction.

 - Stress the concept of officership in instruction and training. Incorporate this concept into formal values instruction as well as in other appropriate parts of the curriculum.

 - Use military history as a framework for the teaching of values, leadership and decision-making. Keep the completion of a military history course as a commissioning requirement.

 - Introduce instruction on problem-solving, decision-making and oral and written communications in the ROTC curriculum. Instruction should aim at a systematic development of cadet briefing and writing skills. Take

advantage of writing and public speaking improvement programs offered by host academic institutions.

- Adopt a small-group learning format for the ROTC program. The adoption of this format will facilitate cadet acquisition of critical thinking skills, give the Professor of Military Science a more balanced view of a cadet's capabilities, and bring the ROTC program on line with the rest of the officer education and training system.
- Develop and field computer delivered lessons that can help the cadet build a knowledge base in subjects such as the five-paragraph field order, Army structure, systems, missions and branches, etc. These modules could be incorporated into courses, used as remedial or supplementary instruction, or used as reference material.

Training

- Teach only those common core skills on campus that directly contribute to the cadet's functioning as a member of a team (squad). Requiring cadets to lead a squad in the performance of a mission is a primary method of leadership development. Cadets must be taught those common core skills that they need to know for basic squad functioning but training time should not be used to teach skills beyond this level. In conjunction with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCST) at TRADOC Headquarters, review the precommissioning common core task list to identify tasks that are not essential to squad functioning (e.g., communicate by tactical radio, perform first aid for a suspected fracture, transport a casualty, etc.) and transfer responsibility for these tasks to the officer basic courses.
- Make leadership laboratories more interesting and challenging by incorporating adventure training and other demanding activities into them. At the same time, make them less time restrictive by allowing units to consolidate laboratory periods.
- Instill confidence and develop physical and emotional hardiness in cadets by requiring them to engage in physically demanding and mentally challenging activities both on campus and at Advanced Camp. This should be done periodically and should be progressive in

nature with the tasks becoming increasingly demanding as the cadet progresses from the MS I through the MS IV years. Examples of such activities are: obstacle courses, rope climbs, long-distance land navigation courses, simulated emergencies, rappelling and rock climbing.

- Raise the ROTC physical fitness standard to prepare lieutenants for the expected increase in the operational tempo, stress, complexity and ambiguity of the future battlefield. Higher physical fitness standards will help develop physical and psychological hardiness.
- Provide high quality performance feedback to cadets in a timely manner. Shift the emphasis of the evaluator from the completion of the assessment card (blue card) to providing meaningful feedback. The blue card, it must be made clear to the evaluator, is only a tool to facilitate and record feedback.

Organizational Structure

- Establish a Training Development Cell at Cadet Command Headquarters responsible for developing a curriculum that addresses the developmental recommendations of this report. The duties of the Training Development Cell should encompass the development of case studies on subjects such as leadership, character development, ethics, and decision-making. It should also assist the School of Cadet Command in developing instruction on "how to teach" for the benefit of ROTC instructors.
- Reconfigure the School of Cadet Command (SOCC) to teach cadre how to teach, lead group discussions, conduct after action reviews, give feedback and assess the developmental needs of groups and individuals.
- Change the SOCC curriculum so that more attention is given to developmental issues relevant to college-aged students.
- Establish a system of cadre certification to upgrade the quality of instruction. To accomplish cadre certification, adopt one of the following options:

- Create a special "how to teach" track at the SOCC for Professors of Military Science only; they would, in turn, certify their cadre.
 - Create a general "how to teach" track at SOCC for everyone.
 - Develop an exportable instructional package consisting of compact disks, videotapes or other media.
- Use the Training Development Cell to evaluate and develop training options for the certification of cadre.
 - Encourage all Professors of Military Science to use the university's faculty development resources to assist in teaching their cadre how to teach. The Cadet Command Training Development Cell should develop a statement of objectives that can be given to the university's faculty development personnel to guide their efforts in meeting the needs of the ROTC cadre.
 - Establish a biennial review process to ensure the ROTC program remains relevant and consistent with the changes and decisions affecting Army XXI and Army After Next and developments in the higher education community. The regular and systematic review of the ROTC program would ensure that adaptation to change becomes a recognized and accepted part of the ROTC system.
 - Establish a planning group within Cadet Command Headquarters to provide consistency and direction for the biennial review process, guide the work of the Training Development Cell, and integrate the future-oriented activities and projects of the separate directorates and special staff offices. The need for a planning office has become more pressing since the beginning of the functional transfer, an on-going process that is shifting many of the functions traditionally performed at the regional to the national level. In the process, Cadet Command Headquarters has expanded and become, by necessity, more involved in the day-to-day activities of ROTC battalions. This will tend to strengthen the headquarters already strong "customer service" orientation, an orientation that results in an emphasis on solving immediate problems. Customer service is very important but customer service when pursued with a single-mindedness that excludes or marginalizes other equally important aspects of the command's mission can be debilitating.

- Replace active duty supply and administrative personnel with civilians whenever practicable. These civilians could be civil service, contract, or university employees.
- Take greater advantage of the Total Army School System (TASS) and university-based distance learning laboratories as they become increasingly available across the country.

ROTC Advanced Camp

- Revise Advanced Camp to make it more focused on training and less focused on evaluation. At present, Advanced Camp is seen by cadets and cadre as a "final examination" of the technical and tactical skills that cadets are expected to master over the course of their cadet career. As a consequence, a major emphasis of the first three years of on-campus training is the preparation for Advanced Camp. Cadets devote almost their entire junior year to this task. The time spent in this preparation significantly reduces the time available to develop the higher level cognitive and leadership competencies recommended in this report. Reducing the emphasis on evaluation will free up time on the unit schedule to develop these competencies.
- Shift as much tactical and technical training as practicable to Advanced Camp. This will also free up cadet time during the academic year, allowing cadets to concentrate more on academic endeavors and to become more involved in student activities. Facilitating cadet involvement in student activities is an excellent way to develop cadet interpersonal skills and leadership competencies, provided of course that the cadet assumes a leadership role in the organization. Making this shift will also help eliminate the "ROTC major syndrome" and move the ROTC and the ROTC cadet from the periphery to the mainstream of college life. The ROTC will become a program for injecting the university into the Army rather than a program for injecting the Army into the university, as some argue is the case today.
- Take full advantage of the greater resources available at Advanced Camp to increase training fidelity, extend the training and instruction presented on campus,

and concentrate on tasks that cannot, or should not, be trained on campus (e.g., artillery call for fire; nuclear, biological and chemical subjects, etc.).

Scholarships and Recruiting

- Modify existing recruiting and marketing strategies to reflect changing U.S. demographics—especially the growing Hispanic and Asian segments of the population.
- Increase recognition and credit of university and community leadership positions by increasing the number of CES points for holding such positions.
- Recommend that the Commanding General, Cadet Command, brief the command on the rationale and goals for the recommendations adopted as a result of the long range review and enlist support for their implementation.

SECTION IV

Conclusion

The current Army ROTC program is producing first-rate leaders for the Army and for the nation. The Army must retain those aspects of the ROTC program that have proven so valuable over the last twelve years, particularly the excellent leader development and assessment program and the system of rigorous and stressful training at Advanced Camp. Because the ROTC currently "has things about right," the Army should proceed cautiously with any revisions to the ROTC program, effecting evolutionary rather than revolutionary change.

At the same time, the Army must not allow its largest commissioning program to become stagnant. It must regularly modify the program to keep pace with requirements and conditions. Recent advances in information technology and changes in the international environment call for a lieutenant with a broad range of intellectual skills, abilities and perspectives. To equip the lieutenant with these skills, abilities and perspectives, the ROTC must emphasize the educational component of its program of instruction more than it has in the past. This will necessitate shifting much of the military skills training currently conducted on campus to summer camp.

Three of the recommendations contained in this report are especially important: the establishment of a Training Development Cell, the creation of a planning office within Cadet Command Headquarters and the initiation of a formal biennial review process. The planning office is necessary to help craft a vision and set an azimuth for the future. Without such an office, the long-term needs of the command will continue to be subordinated to short-term requirements. The Training Development Cell is necessary to guide and give coherence to curriculum development and to translate the plans of the planning office into concrete terms. The initiation of a biennial review process will help ensure that the ROTC keeps abreast of requirements, conforms to prevailing conditions and keeps in touch with the field. It is also evidence of the command's recognition that a review is not a discrete event with a beginning and an ending but a continuing attempt to manage and adjust to change.